Regrets destroying nuclear weapons in Ukraine: 'We were foolish to trust them'
Soviet nuclear weapons (file photo)
A Critical Look At Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament Decision
Article descriptionAuthor, Paul AdamsPosition, Diplomatic CorrespondentDecember 8, 2024
Pros and Cons of Destroying Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine
Pros:
1. Non-Proliferation Goals: Aligned with global efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles, contributing to international peace. 2. Global Support: Gained assurances of security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through agreements like the Budapest Memorandum (1994). 3. Economic Assistance: Accessed financial aid and integration opportunities from Western powers by relinquishing nuclear weapons. 4. Moral High Ground: Projected Ukraine as a responsible and peace-driven nation internationally. Cons:
1. Security Risks: Loss of a critical deterrent left Ukraine vulnerable to aggression, as seen in the 2014 Crimea annexation and 2022 invasion by Russia. 2. Trust Deficit: Weakness in enforcement of international guarantees led to disillusionment with agreements like the Budapest Memorandum. 3. Geopolitical Leverage: Missed the strategic advantage that nuclear weapons could have provided in negotiations with global powers. 4. National Sovereignty: Dependency on external security assurances undermined Ukraine’s self-reliance in protecting its sovereignty.
Pros:
1. Non-Proliferation Goals: Aligned with global efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles, contributing to international peace.
2. Global Support: Gained assurances of security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through agreements like the Budapest Memorandum (1994).
3. Economic Assistance: Accessed financial aid and integration opportunities from Western powers by relinquishing nuclear weapons.
4. Moral High Ground: Projected Ukraine as a responsible and peace-driven nation internationally.
Cons:
1. Security Risks: Loss of a critical deterrent left Ukraine vulnerable to aggression, as seen in the 2014 Crimea annexation and 2022 invasion by Russia.
2. Trust Deficit: Weakness in enforcement of international guarantees led to disillusionment with agreements like the Budapest Memorandum.
3. Geopolitical Leverage: Missed the strategic advantage that nuclear weapons could have provided in negotiations with global powers.
4. National Sovereignty: Dependency on external security assurances undermined Ukraine’s self-reliance in protecting its sovereignty.
Under dark gray skies and a thin layer of snow, the remnants of the Cold War are reminiscent of Ukraine's Soviet past.
Missiles, rocket launchers and transporters are symbols of a time when Ukraine played a key role in the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program, considered its last line of defense.
Beneath the partially raised concrete and steel lid of a silo, a large intercontinental ballistic missile is visible.
But the missile is not the real thing, but a broken replica. The silo has been filled with debris for nearly 30 years.
The entire base, located near the central Ukrainian city of Primysl, was long ago converted into a museum.
When Ukraine emerged as an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, it renounced its nuclear weapons.
But nearly three years after the Russian invasion, many now feel that this was a mistake.
Thirty years ago, on December 5, 1994, at a ceremony in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan decided to eliminate their nuclear weapons. In return, they were given security guarantees from the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia.
A third of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was located on Ukrainian soil, and the decision to destroy these weapons was a significant one, welcomed internationally.
US President Bill Clinton said on the occasion that ‘the security assurances we have given to these three countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) underline our commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of their states.’
Oleksandr Soshchenko, a graduate of a military academy in Kharkiv, arrived in Primysl two years later as the decommissioning process was beginning.
He saw missiles being removed and silos being blown up. Now he is back at the same base as a museum curator.
Oleksandr Soshchenko believes Ukraine made a mistake by destroying all nuclear weapons thirty years ago.
The suffering inflicted on Ukraine by Russia for a decade, which the international community has failed or is not interested in stopping, can only lead to one conclusion.
Oleksandr Soshchenko says, “What is happening in Ukraine now, in my personal opinion, was a mistake that we completely destroyed the nuclear weapons, but it was a political issue. The top leadership made the decision and we just followed orders.”
He says that the decision to destroy the nuclear weapons was understandable at the time. No one thought that Russia would attack Ukraine after 20 years.
In 1994, Ukrainian Ambassador to Britain, Sergei Komissarenko, says: “We were naive and trusted.”
He says: “When Britain, the United States, Russia and France joined, we thought that was enough.”
For a poor country that was emerging from Soviet power decades later, the idea of maintaining nuclear weapons seemed unreasonable.
“Why spend money on building or keeping nuclear weapons when you can use them for industry or prosperity,” says Komisarenko.
But Ukraine is now using the anniversary of that ill-fated 1994 treaty to make a point.
At a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels this week, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Seybash showed a copy of the Budapest Memorandum in a green folder.
“This document could not save Ukraine and transatlantic security. We must not repeat such mistakes again,” he said.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry calls the memorandum a “monument to the lapses in strategic security decisions.”
The question now for Ukraine and its allies is how to ensure Ukraine’s security.
For President Volodymyr Zelensky, the answer is clear.
Zelensky reiterated his position on Sunday: “The best security guarantees for us are with NATO.”
Despite Zelensky’s continued insistence that only membership in the Western alliance can ensure Ukraine’s survival against its larger and more greedy neighbor, it is clear that NATO members are still divided on the issue.
With many NATO members objecting to Ukraine’s membership, the alliance has so far said only that Ukraine’s path to potential membership is “irreversible,” but has given no timeframe for when that might happen.
Ukraine’s allies are talking about “peace through strength” to put Ukraine in a stronger position ahead of possible peace talks under Donald Trump next year.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Tuesday that the more military support we provide to Ukraine, the stronger its hand at the negotiating table.
Amid uncertainty over how Donald Trump will handle Ukraine, the United States and Germany are sending large amounts of new equipment to Ukraine.
It is not yet clear how Donald Trump will react to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Some in Ukraine are suggesting that a country that is serious about its security cannot afford to abandon its nuclear weapons, especially when its most important ally, the United States, could abandon it in the near future.
Last month, officials denied a report that the Ukrainian Defense Ministry was considering a proposal that could produce a basic nuclear weapon within months.
Former Deputy Defense Minister Olena Frolova says it is no coincidence that the leak occurred. “This is clearly an option that is being discussed in Ukraine, among experts.”
“If we feel that we are not getting any help and that we are losing this war and we have to protect our people... I think that could be an option.’
The return of nuclear weapons to Primysl seems unlikely in the near future.
Only one 30-meter-deep command silo at the base, completed in 1979, has been fully preserved.
It was built to withstand a nuclear attack, with heavy steel doors and underground tunnels connecting it to the rest of the base.
A small, cramped control room below, accessed by an elevator. Here, coded commands for the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles were received, decoded, and executed.
Oleksandr says that abandoning nuclear weapons in 1990 was certainly a wise decision because the United States was not our enemy.
But Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal also included a variety of tactical weapons with ranges between 100 and 1,000 kilometers.
“As it turned out, the enemy was very close,” says Oleksandr. We could have had a few dozen tactical warheads. They would have guaranteed the security of our country.’
Related Topics
#Ukraine #Ukraine_Russia_Conflict #Vladimir_Putin #Russia #America #War
No comments: